With Luxembourg in Mind...The Remaking of National Policies in the Face of ECJ Jurisprudence by Blauberger, Michael.
With Luxembourg in Mind … The Remaking of National 
Policies in the Face of ECJ Jurisprudence 
 
Michael Blauberger 
 
Paper presented at the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference 
Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
This contribution analyses EU member state political responses to ECJ challenges. Faced with 
high consensus requirements at the European level, member states often have to respond 
unilaterally and explore how to pursue autonomous regulatory goals in ‘ECJ-proof’ ways. 
Based on an actor-centered institutionalist framework, member states’ domestic responses to 
one prominent series of ECJ judgments (Laval, Rüffert, Commission vs Luxembourg) are 
traced empirically. By anticipating potential legal challenges through the European 
Commission or private parties and building on existing legal precedent, the case studies show 
that member state governments manage to preserve significant parts of their original 
legislation while making it ECJ-proof. 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael Blauberger, Jean Monnet Fellow 
European University Institute / RSCAS 
Via delle Palazzine 17 
I- 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Email: michael.blauberger@eui.eu 
 2 
INTRODUCTION1  
When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered its preliminary ruling on the Laval2 case 
in December 2007, critical comments on the EU’s judiciary reached an extraordinary level. 
The ECJ was accused of promoting “social dumping” and launching an “attack on workers’ 
rights” (cf. Mayer 2009: 8). Due to the ECJ’s expansive interpretation of European market 
freedoms, it was argued, the “very autonomy of Member States’ labour and social 
constitutions is undermined” (Joerges and Rödl 2009: 13). As a response, commentators 
considered the “nuclear option” of member states’ deliberate non-compliance with European 
jurisprudence in order to constrain court activism (Scharpf 2009b: 200). Notably, recent 
criticism towards the ECJ is not limited to accusations of “social blindness” from the left. 
Referring to a different strand of jurisprudence (on anti-discrimination), the conservative and 
former German president Roman Herzog pleaded to “Stop the European Court of Justice” 
which was accused of “depriving member states of their very own fundamental competences” 
(Herzog and Gerken 2008).  
Certainly, balancing community and autonomy has become ever more delicate for the 
ECJ in an enlarged and deeply integrated European Union (EU). Yet, the nuclear option of 
outright resistance against ECJ rulings has not been drawn or threatened by member state 
governments. At the same time, joint responses to correct the European judiciary are faced 
with high consensus requirements of EU decision-making. Consequently, challenged by ECJ 
jurisprudence, member state governments are typically left with one immediate option to 
respond: They may explore unilaterally how to preserve domestic regulatory goals in a way 
that is compatible with the requirements of the European judiciary. Thus, in response to the 
ECJ’s preliminary ruling in the Laval case, the Swedish government mandated a commission 
to inquire possible legislative action (Swedish Government 2008: 8):  
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“The objective must be to maintain the fundamental principle in the Swedish 
labour market: that the main responsibility for regulating pay and employment 
terms and conditions has been assigned to the social partners. At the same 
time, Community law (…) must also be fully respected”  
This contribution investigates when and how member state governments re-regulate “with 
Luxembourg in mind”, i.e. trying to partly preserve their domestic regulatory autonomy while 
solving and anticipating conflicts with EU law. The next section locates the study within the 
literature on judicialisation. Section three develops an actor-centred institutionalist approach 
to study the underlying interests and the strategies of member state governments for making 
domestic regulation ECJ-proof. On this basis, section four analyses EU member states’ 
legislative responses to a series of three closely interrelated ECJ judgments: Laval, Rüffert3, 
and Commission vs Luxembourg4. In contrast to the harsh initial reactions, the text concludes 
that EU member states have been able to preserve their original regulatory goals in ECJ-proof 
ways, albeit to varying degrees and through different strategies.  
POLITICAL RESPONSES TO EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 
EU judicial politics has attracted increasing attention by scholars of European integration 
during the past decade. The debate moved beyond the intergovernmentalism vs. 
neofunctionalism divide and specified mechanisms and scope conditions of European 
integration through law. The close linkage of national and European courts through 
preliminary reference procedures, the differing time horizons of judges and politicians, the 
self-sustaining nature of legal discourse and precedent, and the role of private litigation were 
put forward to account for the strength of the European judiciary (Stone Sweet 2010). As a 
result, the ECJ decides not only individual cases of conflict, but influences more broadly the 
strategic behaviour of political actors.  
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Most studies on this “judicialisation of politics” focus at the EU level (see Stone Sweet 
2010: 27-28). For example, the European Commission has been shown to instrumentalise the 
threat of court activism to overcome member state resistance against European legislation 
(Schmidt 2000). In principle, member states may respond collectively to European 
jurisprudence by further harmonising EU policies or by turning back court-driven integration 
through re-nationalisation policies. In both directions, however, member states face high 
consensus hurdles. Whereas the latter option of overriding the ECJ has proven to be largely 
hypothetical (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2010), positive integration often lacks behind and can 
only partially compensate for court-driven negative integration (Scharpf 2009a: 6f.).  
At least in the short run, therefore, EU member states can only respond to ECJ 
challenges at the national level (see Figure 1). Domestic responses to European jurisprudence 
are often difficult to detect and have attracted relatively little attention in the Europeanisation 
literature (Töller 2010: 429). A strand of this research which also addresses the role of the 
ECJ centres on questions of compliance (Panke 2007). Most prominently, Lisa Conant has 
argued that EU member states typically “contain” compliance by applying ECJ rulings only to 
individual court cases while neglecting their broader policy implications (Conant 2002: 32). 
Yet, the “contained compliance” approach only partly captures domestic responses to 
European jurisprudence. Member state governments may come under pressure to adjust their 
policies more broadly in order to avoid the legal uncertainty of further Court challenges 
(Schmidt et al. 2008). Various recent policy studies have found the ECJ to trigger significant 
changes at the national level, even in areas which were no genuine EU policy exists, e.g. 
regarding corporate taxation (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2010) and healthcare policy 
(Martinsen and Vrangbæk 2008). What is more, these adjustments can only insufficiently be 
described in terms of compliance or non-compliance. ECJ rulings hardly ever prescribe a 
specific policy response, but rather circumscribe a legal corridor within which member states 
have different options to remake their policies.  
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Figure 1: Political responses to European jurisprudence 
 
Thus, even full compliance normally comprises a variety of possible national responses to 
ECJ jurisprudence and the criterion of compliance captures only one, though important, 
aspect of them. Instead of looking top-down and asking for the ECJ’s power to induce 
member state compliance, we may take a bottom-up perspective and analyse member state 
governments’ strategies to pursue autonomous regulatory goals in ECJ-proof ways. This 
approach focuses on the grey area between outright non-compliance and ‘regulatory 
surrender’ (i.e. a situation in which compliance with EU law fully determines or even pre-
empts domestic action). The following section proposes an analytical framework to assess 
empirically if and through which strategies member state governments still manage to defend 
regulatory autonomy in ECJ-proof ways. 
REGULATING WITH LUXEMBOURG IN MIND 
Why and how do EU member state governments (re-)regulate “with Luxembourg in mind”? 
Two aspects need to be addressed separately in order to answer these questions: actors’ 
interests and the strategic setting within which they are pursued (cf. Frieden 1999: 39). The 
next subsection discusses when member states governments actually have an interest in 
regulating with Luxembourg in mind. Subsequently, the institutional setting is examined and 
two types of strategies to arrive at ECJ-proof domestic regulation are distinguished.  
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Balancing community and autonomy 
When should we expect member states to respond to ECJ jurisprudence in a way that 
accommodates autonomous regulatory goals to the requirements of European law? The first 
part of this question has been answered by the Europeanisation literature. In order to expect 
any domestic response to an EU impulse, there need to be, first, some latent “misfit” (or 
‘mismatch’ Héritier 1996) between existing European and national and, secondly, interested 
actors who actually transform this misfit into adaptational pressures (Börzel and Risse 2007: 
490-491). In addition, it is argued here, if their constituency has a strong interest in preserving 
the regulatory status quo, national policy-makers need to balance community compatibility 
and regulatory autonomy.  
When the ECJ finds national rules incompatible with European law, it creates pressure 
to adjust at the domestic level; member states have to respond somehow. Nevertheless, one 
must not overestimate the ECJ’s power to promote domestic change single-handedly. In her 
study on the German Bundestag, Tracy Slagter (2009) has shown how national legislators 
may respond in a rather limited and punctual way as long as they are only challenged by 
individual ECJ judgements. Such a national strategy of “wait and see” (Slagter 2009: 190), 
however, gets more difficult to sustain if the ECJ builds up broader lines of legal reasoning in 
series of cases and successively fills the legal gaps of previous judgements. If challenging 
ECJ jurisprudence goes along with continuous case supply by the Commission and/or private 
litigants, national policy-makers face strong adaptational pressures; “contained compliance” 
or even outright non-compliance are hardly an option.  
Sometimes, ECJ rulings provide welcome opportunities for incumbent member state 
governments to get rid off unwanted rules from its predecessors while shifting the blame to 
the EU level (Tallberg 2002: 27). When they are confronted with simultaneous pressure to 
preserve national regulation after an ECJ challenge, however, member state governments face 
a dilemma. If their own constituency is negatively affected by an ECJ ruling, regulatory 
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surrender is not an option either. Under this condition, the question of how to preserve the 
remaining national regulatory autonomy in a community-compatible way becomes crucial. 
Thus, when analysing domestic responses to ECJ jurisprudence, we have to take the interests 
of the governments’ constituency into account rather than assuming a genuine interest in 
protecting national regulatory autonomy.  
In sum, neither some legal misfit nor its challenge through an ECJ ruling will normally 
trigger an automatic response at the national level. Interests matter, both in order to turn a 
particular misfit into adaptational pressures and to counter these pressures in order to preserve 
autonomous national regulation. As a result, EU member state governments cannot easily 
escape a situation of conflicting pressures to preserve and to adjust domestic regulation. They 
have to re-regulate with Luxembourg in mind.  
Strategies of ECJ-proof regulation  
In order to make national legislation ECJ-proof, member state governments need to be 
creative. A great diversity of possible strategies to arrive at community-compatible regulation 
exists: For example, member states may emulate regulations of other countries that have 
already been found to be community-compatible by the Court; they may go for an informal 
approval of draft legislation by the European Commission, they may support national 
regulation by the collection of extensive factual evidence; or they may promote private self-
regulation instead of formal legislation in order to avoid legal conflicts at the EU level . 
But how can the diversity be organised into meaningful categories or types of national 
regulatory strategies? And what accounts for a governments’ choice of one type of strategy 
rather than another? The main proposition here is to distinguish member states’ regulatory 
strategies according to whose possible challenges they try to anticipate (see Figure 2). The 
main actors who supply the Court with cases are the European Commission and, mostly via 
national courts, private litigants. The choice of national regulatory strategy, I hypothesize, 
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depends on the anticipated legal procedure, i.e. the channel through which judicial challenges 
of national regulation would most likely reach the ECJ.  
Under Article 258 TFEU, the Commission initiates infringement proceedings against 
member states and, when necessary, submits cases to the ECJ. If national policy-makers are 
threatened by an infringement proceeding, they will attempt to anticipate potential challenges 
of the Commission, e.g. through informal contacts to Brussels. In fact, most infringement 
proceedings get closed at an early stage. An alternative or complementary route to the Court 
is a preliminary reference according to Article 267 TFEU. Whereas direct access to the 
European courts is limited for private parties, national courts may provide indirect access for 
private litigants by requesting preliminary rulings from the ECJ. Thus, if national policy-
makers are uncertain about the potential result of a preliminary reference from a domestic 
court, they will try to avoid private litigation in the first place, e.g. by including social 
partners in the process of regulation or by mitigating conflicts about rule application before 
they reach the courts.  
 
Figure 2: A strategic framework: national legislation in the face of ECJ jurisprudence 
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Two hypotheses will be analysed in the case studies. First, legal precedent reduces the costs 
of designing community-compatible rules and the uncertainty about possible legal challenges. 
If the ECJ has already explicitly endorsed national regulation in one case, other member states 
can use this template for designing their own policies ECJ-proof and for discouraging 
potential litigators. Less formal, if the Commission negotiates a compromise with one 
member state government and refrains from initiating or further pursuing an infringement 
proceeding, this compromise may become a model for other countries as well.  
Second, depending on the strategic context, political consensus or dissent reduces the 
risk of legal challenges against domestic regulation. On the one hand, preliminary references 
by national courts are less likely, if the regulatory status quo is supported by a strong societal 
consensus. For example, Marlene Wind (2010) explains the reluctance of Swedish and Danish 
courts to refer cases to the ECJ by consensual and corporatist features of national policy-
making: “The Nordic states are unitary states, extremely homogeneous and have a corporatist 
structure. Conflicts are therefore usually resolved outside the court system” (Wind 2010: 
1059). On the other hand, infringement proceedings are less likely, if the Commission itself is 
split regarding the community-compatibility of national measures. Decisions are taken by the 
Commission as a collective body (i.e. de jure by an absolute majority and de facto mostly 
consensual) and compliance research hints at the Commission’s selectiveness in pursuing 
possible infringements (Conant 2002: 75f.). As a consequence, internal dissent in the 
Commission may raise member states’ opportunities to find support at the EU level and to 
avoid infringement action.  
NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE POSTED WORKERS CASES 
Based on the analytical framework outline before, the remainder of this text analyses national 
responses to a series of closely interrelated ECJ judgements: Laval, Rüffert and Commission 
vs Luxembourg. The cases have been chosen for three main reasons. To begin with, given the 
 10 
extraordinary public attention they attracted, these judgements are “most likely cases” to find 
member state governments under simultaneous pressures to adjust and to preserve national 
rules. At the same time, many observers interpreted the judgments as severe restrictions of 
national regulatory autonomy. They are, therefore, “hard cases” concerning member states’ 
chances successfully to preserve national autonomy in an ECJ-proof way. Finally, the cases 
offer sufficient variation with regard to the factors discussed before, including judicial action 
via national courts and the Commission. Before analysing national legislative responses, the 
cases will be briefly presented. 
Laval, Rüffert, Commission vs Luxembourg 
The ECJ ruled on Laval, Rüffert and Commission vs Luxembourg in late 2007 and early 2008 
and it soon became common to refer to these cases as a distinct series of judgments. In 
addition, the judgment in Viking5 is usually regarded to complete the ECJ’s “Laval quartet” 
(Malmberg 2010: 8). The rulings challenged national measures to protect workers’ rights in 
the context of EU enlargement. In Laval, Rüffert and Commission vs Luxemburg, national 
measures were found to restrict the European freedom of services under the Posted Workers 
Directive 96/71/EC (in the following: PWD). According to the PWD, the Court ruled, 
member states were not allowed to apply their entire terms and conditions of work to posted 
workers, but only a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection. 
The Laval conflict involved the Swedish building workers’ union (Byggnads) and a 
Latvian construction company (Laval un Partneri) which had been commissioned to build a 
school in Vaxholm, Sweden. After negotiations on the working conditions of posted workers 
had failed between these two parties, Laval signed a collective agreement with a Latvian trade 
union instead. Swedish trade unionists denied the validity of this agreement and took 
collective action by blocking the construction site. Laval brought the conflict to the Swedish 
Labour Court which eventually referred the case to the ECJ. In brief, the ECJ acknowledged 
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the fundamental right of trade unions to take collective action, but found the concrete actions 
disproportionate. In addition, the Swedish “Lex Britannia” which permitted collective action 
irrespective of existing collective agreements under foreign law was found to be 
discriminatory.  
The Rüffert judgement challenged the Public Procurement Act of the German Land 
Lower-Saxony. According to this act, construction firms could only win a public tender if 
they committed themselves by a declaration to pay at least the wages prescribed by the local 
collective agreement (Tariftreueerklärung, in the following translated as “collective 
agreements declaration”, cf. Rödl 2009: 2). A German company won a tender and 
subcontracted work to a Polish company. When it became public that Polish workers were 
paid less than their German colleagues at the site, the government annulled the contract and 
imposed financial penalties. The German company’s complaint reached the ECJ as a 
preliminary reference. The Court ruled that Lower Saxony’s Public Procurement Act imposed 
an unjustified restriction of the freedom to provide services under the PWD, in particular as it 
protected only workers in the public sector and referred to collective agreements that were not 
universally applicable.  
Finally, Commission vs Luxembourg resulted from an infringement proceeding of the 
European Commission which argued that Luxembourg’s legislation went beyond what was 
allowed under the PWD and, thus, constituted an unjustified restriction of the freedom of 
services. Referring to Article 3(10) of the PWD on public policy exceptions, Luxembourg had 
extended its entire regulation regarding terms and conditions of employment to situations of 
cross-border service provision. The ECJ followed the Commission’s argument and declared 
that Luxembourg, by imposing requirements on foreign service providers that were not 
covered by a narrow interpretation of the public policy exception, had implemented the 
Posting of Workers Directive incorrectly.  
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The ECJ judgments spurred strong reactions, not just in the member states affected, 
but also at the European level. In a resolution of 22 October 2008 on “Challenges to 
Collective Agreements in the EU”, the European Parliament suggested a reform of the PWD. 
The same month, the Commission organised a “Forum on Workers’ Rights and Economic 
Freedoms” to consult member states and social partners on the consequences of the ECJ’s 
rulings. It soon became clear, however, that community legislative action was unlikely to 
develop in the near future (Bücker and Warneck 2010: 121f.). A joint report of European 
social partners from March 2010 on the Laval quartet shows fundamental disagreement about 
the legal (un)certainty provided by the ECJ’s rulings and the desirability of a reform of the 
PWD (European Social Partners 2010: 7, 14). In the run-up to his re-election in September 
2009, Commission President Barroso proposed an EU Regulation instead of revising the 
PWD; an idea that was taken up in Mario Monti’s “New Strategy for the Single Market” 
reported to the Commission in May 2010 and included in the Commission’s proposal 
“Towards a Single Market Act” in November 2010. 
In the short and medium term, therefore, EU member states had to react domestically 
to the Laval jurisprudence. By the end of 2010, legislative responses to the three ECJ 
judgments were taken in four countries – those directly affected plus Denmark (Eurofound 
2010: 24f.). In the following, these legislative responses will be analysed in turn.  
Laval: Swedish and Danish responses 
The ECJ’s judgement in Laval was perceived as a profound challenge to existing Swedish 
legislation and to the country’s system of autonomous collective bargaining as well as an 
indirect threat to similar structures in Denmark (Malmberg and Sigeman 2008). Particularly 
contentious was the Court’s interpretation of the PWD as providing a largely exhaustive 
catalogue of working conditions to be guaranteed for posted workers (Joerges and Rödl 2009: 
17). Collective agreements which are not declared universally applicable and which require 
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more favourable working conditions than the “nucleus” circumscribed by the Directive were 
found to “misfit” with EU law.  
After the ECJ had identified this legal misfit, the threat of continued private litigation 
created strong adaptational pressures in Sweden and Denmark. In its response to the 
judgment, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) welcomed the Laval 
ruling and called for quick legislative change. In Denmark, a similar case had emerged in 
2005, but was not referred to the ECJ (Neergaard and Nielsen 2010: 44f.). After Laval, 
however, the Danish court could have hardly upheld its argument that it was sufficiently clear 
that collective action does not constitute an unjustified obstacle to European market freedoms.  
By contrast, the European Commission did not actively challenge Swedish and Danish 
legislation and showed internal tensions. When the former Commissioner for Internal Market 
and Services McCreevy publicly criticised the Swedish government and Swedish unions 
during the conflict, President Barroso had to clarify that the Commission did not take sides 
(Lindstrom 2010: 1315). In Court, the Commission did not challenge any of the two parties’ 
claims, leaving it essentially to the ECJ and national courts to balance on a case-by-case basis 
(ibid.: 1317).6 After the judgment, the Commission still argued that it was for national 
authorities and social partners to come up with adequate responses. This was interpreted as an 
indication “that the Commission will not, in its capacity as guardian of the Treaty, insist on a 
strict interpretation of the case law concerning the Posting of Workers Directive, but rather 
allow the Member States some margin of appreciation when adjusting their different 
industrial relation regimes to the new case law” (Malmberg 2010: 10). 
The initial reactions of the Swedish and Danish governments were the same: Given 
that joint European action was highly unlikely in the near future, commissions were appointed 
to propose domestic legislative adjustments in response to the ECJ’s jurisprudence (Malmberg 
2010: 10-14). As already cited in the introduction, their mandate was to preserve as far as 
possible, the systems of autonomous collective bargaining in a community-compatible way. 
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The national commissions concluded their work at different rates and, largely following the 
commissions’ proposals, legislative changes were adopted by the end of 2008 in Denmark and 
by the end of 2009 in Sweden.  
The Danish7 and Swedish8 legislative responses exhibit important commonalities: 
Both reforms were developed in co-operation with social partners and reaffirm the autonomy 
of collective bargaining, rather than resorting to one of the options to regulate posted work 
explicitly recognized by the Court, i.e. by setting a statutory minimum wage or by declaring 
collective agreements generally binding (Rönnmar 2010: 285). Based on an “innovative re-
interpretation” (Bücker and Warneck 2010: 22) of Article 3(8) of the PWD, foreign service 
providers are now informed that they can be required to conclude an agreement which 
corresponds to existing collective agreements “concluded by the most representative 
employers’ and labour organisations at national level and which are applied throughout 
national territory” (for a detailed legal discussion, cf. Swedish Government 2008: 22-25). At 
the same time, in order to comply with the ECJ’s jurisprudence, collective bargaining and 
collective actions became subject to several restrictions. Collective agreements can only be 
extended to posted work if they define minimum working conditions and do not go beyond 
the “hard core” of the PWD. Moreover, foreign service providers must obtain sufficient 
information in advance on the requirements which may be imposed upon them. For this 
purpose and in order to help solving potential conflicts at an early stage, the role of the 
Swedish Work Environment Authority as a liaison office was strengthened.  
A closer look at the legislative responses to Laval, however, reveals significant 
differences. Overall, the Danish response explores more boldly the limits of the remaining 
national regulatory autonomy. Danish legislation defines “minimum pay” more widely than 
the Swedish reform (Kilpatrick 2009: 858; Malmberg 2010: 12-13). Conditions regarding 
holidays and leave that are imposed upon Danish employers may be “converted” into a fixed 
sum when calculating the minimum pay demanded from foreign service providers. In 
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addition, the Swedish reform explicitly prohibits collective action if the employer can show 
that the posted workers enjoy at least as favourable conditions as follow from the minimum 
conditions of a collective agreement. This “evidential requirement” can be met by the 
employer through a collective agreement in the home country or simply through personal 
employment contracts (Rönnmar 2010: 285). Finally, the Swedish Lex Britannia was 
amended in order to preclude collective action if the conditions of the Posting of Workers’ 
Act are fulfilled (ibid.). 
Two factors explain these differences: First, regarding governments’ interests, the 
Swedish liberal-conservative government was only half-heartedly committed to preserve 
national regulation which it mainly perceived to benefit the constituency of Social Democrats. 
Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt had been openly critical of Byggnads in the Laval conflict 
before he came into office in 2006 (see also Davesne 2009; Woolfson et al. 2010: 341). The 
Swedish legislative reform following Laval was criticised by the opposition in parliament and 
by unions for restricting collective action rights even beyond what was required by the ECJ 
and for lowering the protection of workers even when posted from outside the European 
Economic Area (Rönnmar 2010: 285).  
Second, as to the strategic setting, a lack of societal consensus made it more difficult 
for the Swedish government than for the Danish to balance autonomous regulation with the 
requirements of European law. Swedish trade unions took an uncompromising position from 
the beginning of the Laval conflict (Davesne 2009: 12). At the same time, the Swedish 
Employers’ Confederation saw the legal challenges as an opportunity to question collective 
action rights and provided financial support to the Latvian company before the Swedish 
Labour Court (Woolfson et al. 2010: 341). The Swedish Laval commission consulted the 
social partners, but its proposals did not satisfy any of the two camps (ibid.: 344). By contrast, 
the Danish response was motivated by a broad societal consensus to pro-actively preserve the 
existing model of autonomous collective bargaining, and not by a direct challenge of the ECJ. 
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Social partners were equal members in the Danish tripartite Laval commission. Its final report 
was short, delivered already in June 2008 and reflected a consensus among social partners and 
politicians (Bücker and Warneck 2010: 23). The report of the Swedish government’s 
commission comprises more than 400 pages, it engages in a detailed analysis of potential 
legal conflicts, and the legislative changes proposed just entered into force in April 2010 
(Malmberg 2010: 14):  
“The (Danish) idea seems to be to reach a national compromise which will not 
be challenged (…) In Sweden it was clear early on that no such consensus 
would be reached (…) If the Danish report seems anxious not to uncover any 
hidden obstacles for the compromise, the intention of the Swedish report seems 
to be to leave no stone unturned in finding a solution that could not be legally 
questioned.”  
In sum, Sweden and Denmark managed to limit the constraining impact of EU law and to re-
make domestic legislation in ECJ-proof ways. The Court’s narrow interpretation of the PWD 
clearly challenged national regulatory autonomy, but both countries upheld their systems of 
autonomous collective bargaining. In order to make their new legislation ECJ-proof, both 
governments centrally addressed the concerns of potential private litigants, while 
infringement action by the Commission was not perceived as imminent. Different levels of 
societal consensus account for the varying degrees to which the original domestic regulation 
was preserved. Whereas the Swedish response was heavily contested by societal actors and 
resulted in a cautious and legalistic reform, broad societal consensus was a precondition in 
Denmark for finding a quick and so far uncontested legislative answer to the ECJ’s challenge.  
Rüffert: Varying responses of German Länder  
The Rüffert case marked the climax of a political and legal battle about the protection of 
labour standards in public procurement which had been fought for years in Germany (Rödl 
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2009: 3-6). Due to the failure to agree on a federal law on collective agreement declarations, 
various Länder introduced corresponding provisions into their public procurement law; 
governments led by Social Democrats (SPD) as well as by Conservatives (CDU/CSU). As a 
result of this previous history, both major parties were under significant pressure to preserve 
autonomous regulation after Rüffert. At the same time, Länder governments could not simply 
ignore the judgment: The ruling strongly re-affirmed the ECJ’s reasoning in Laval; there were 
explicit threats of private litigation in the case of non-compliance which could have even 
involved damages claims; besides private litigation, the Commission also took a pronounced 
position which was largely congruent with the Court’s final ruling and, hence, legislative 
inaction would most likely lead to infringement procedures.  
As an immediate response to Rüffert, all German Länder with similar legislation as 
Lower-Saxony disapplied the contested provisions in April and May 2008. Yet, the judgment 
has not led to a complete abolishment of collective agreement declarations (see Table 1). 
Instead, several Länder revised their legislation in order to defend at least partly the original 
idea of the declarations while making it ECJ-proof. The variance of political responses is 
already interesting from a purely methodological point: Rüffert did not challenge German 
federal, but regional law which allows us to compare legislative responses across different 
German Länder.  
Land gov. parties collective agreement declarations min. wage date of revision 
conservative/liberal governments 
Baden-
Württemberg 
CDU, FDP  No  - - 
Bavaria CSU, FDP  No (abolished after Rüffert) - 04/2008 
Hesse CDU, FDP  No (disapplied after Rüffert) - 04/2008 
Lower-Saxony CDU, FDP  Yes  - 12/2008 
Saxony CDU, FDP No  - - 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
CDU, FDP No (disapplied after Rüffert) - 05/2008 
mixed governments 
Hamburg CDU, Green  Yes - 04/2010 
Mecklenburg-
West Pom. 
CDU, SPD Yes (planned) - ~ 2011 
Saarland CDU, FDP, 
Green  
Yes - 09/2010 
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Saxony-Anhalt CDU, SPD  No  - - 
Thuringia SPD, CDU 
 
Yes (planned) - 09/2010 (draft) 
social democrat/green governments 
Berlin SPD, Left Yes  € 7,50 06/2010 
Brandenburg SPD, Left  Yes (planned) € 7,50 08/2010 (draft) 
Bremen SPD, Green Yes  € 7,50 11/2009 
North-Rhine 
Westphalia 
SPD, Green  Yes (planned) ? ~ 2011 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
SPD  Yes  € 8,50 11/2010 
Table 1: Collective agreement declarations after Rüffert 
By and large, the overall pattern of legislative reform can be explained by looking at the 
governing parties and the interests of their main constituencies (cf. Sack 2010). Länder 
governed by centre-right coalitions (CDU/CSU, FDP) largely abolished the contested 
provisions – if they had any rules on collective agreement declarations in the first place. The 
presence of the liberal party (FDP) in government fits almost perfectly with the absence of 
provisions on collective agreement declarations. The picture is diverse as regards governing 
coalitions which cannot be clearly classified as centre-right or centre-left. This mixed picture 
reflects the internal divide of the CDU/CSU on the issue of collective agreement declarations 
(Rödl 2009: 6). Labour and unions may not be the core constituency of the conservative party, 
but their interests can hardly be ignored by conservatives either. Finally, all governments led 
by the social-democrats (SPD) reformed or are still reforming their public procurement 
legislation so as to include social criteria in public tenders, comprising the requirement of 
collective agreement declarations. 
The variance of political responses to Rüffert is telling for yet another reason. One can 
observe a trend from legally rather modest to more bold attempts of Länder governments to 
explore the limits of their regulatory autonomy. Lower-Saxony which was first to revise its 
public procurement legislation and which, at first sight, seems an exception among centre-
right governments, kept a very restricted and largely symbolic reference to collective 
agreement declarations. These are demanded only in the construction sector in which, by now, 
a generally binding collective agreement exists anyway. Bremen was the first Land to 
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introduce a specific minimum wage for public procurement into its revised law which, 
however, does not apply to companies from other EU member states. Eventually, the 
comeback of encompassing collective agreement declarations, including minimum wages for 
public procurement, was further promoted through the precedent set by Länder such as Berlin 
and Rhineland-Palatinate.  
The centre-left government of Berlin commissioned three legal surveys in order to 
explore its ECJ-proof options to tie public tenders to social criteria. On this basis, a far-
reaching new procurement law was adopted in June 2010, including the requirement of 
collective agreement declarations, a minimum wage of € 7.50 and other social and ecological 
criteria for public tenders. Since then, Berlin provides a significant example in two respects: 
First, it gives other Länder governments (e.g. in Brandenburg) legal guidance about how to 
revise public procurement legislation in a community-compatible way. Second, reference to 
Berlin is made by non-governmental forces, mainly left opposition parties and unions, in 
order to demand similar reforms and to refute blame-shifting to the European level. 
In sum, Rüffert has provided some Länder governments an opportunity to abolish or 
disapply the requirement of collective agreement declarations, but it has not ruled out entirely 
the possibility to include social provisions in public procurement legislation. Facing the threat 
of both, further private litigation and infringement action of the Commission, Länder 
governments proceeded carefully: firstly, they suspended existing provisions and, then, they 
gradually explored new ways to legally include social considerations into public procurement 
legislation. 
Commission vs Luxembourg: A strategy of “trial and error” 
At first sight, Luxembourg’s legislative response to the ECJ’s ruling in Commission vs 
Luxembourg comes close to “regulatory surrender” as defined earlier. The Commission’s 
main contention concerned Luxembourg’s implementation of the PWD which declared that 
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all laws, regulations and administrative provisions on working conditions constituted 
mandatory provisions falling under national public policy and, therefore, applied entirely to 
workers posted to Luxembourg. Article 1(1) of the implementing law provided an extensive 
list of fourteen issues that were considered essential for the regulation of working conditions. 
Four of these points were questioned by the Commission and found to constitute unjustified 
restrictions of European services freedom by the ECJ: the monitoring of written employment 
contracts, the automatic indexation of salaries, the rules on part-time and fixed-term work, 
and the regulation of collective labour agreements. The revised law basically declares the 
contested provisions inapplicable to posted workers; the “unique goal” of the legislative 
revision being explicitly “to bring legislation in conformity with European jurisprudence”. 9  
The picture looks different, however, if we consider more broadly the motives for the 
original implementing law of 2002 and the revision process in 2010. In 2002, Luxembourg 
had deliberately opted for a legislative strategy of “trial and error”, i.e. interpreting its 
autonomy to regulate posted work extensively first and, then, being taught about its limits by 
the Commission and the ECJ. François Biltgen, Luxembourg’s minister of labour and 
employment responsible for drafting the original and the revised law, justifies the decision not 
to informally negotiate the original law with the Commission:10  
“In fact, such negotiations would have just resulted in imposing a priori upon 
Luxembourg a ‘neoliberal’ interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive (…) 
Instead, the government – with the consent of social partners and parliament – 
preferred to design the law according to its own vision of social Europe and 
national social public policy. (This approach) implicated a certain risk of legal 
action by the Commission, although the Directorate General for Employment 
and Social Affairs, for its part, was not a priori opposed (…) The government 
was aware that a condemnation by the ECJ was possible.” 
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Thus, the original law was written on the basis of a very broad interpretation of national 
regulatory autonomy, supported by societal consensus at home and speculating on internal 
dissent of the Commission. Legislation was adopted under considerable legal uncertainty, no 
legal precedent on the correct interpretation of the PWD existing, and some evidence suggests 
that other member states like Ireland, Italy and Belgium adopted a similar strategy (Eurofound 
2010: 19).  
The ECJ’s judgment in Commission vs Luxembourg set a precedent that narrowed the 
interpretation of permissible public policy exceptions from the services freedom. Faced with 
this precedent, Luxembourg’s government adhered to the goal of preserving “l’esprit du 
législateur de 2002”, but clearly refrained from further exploring uncertain legal territory. The 
proposition of labour representatives to subsume per se all collective agreements with general 
applicability under the public policy exception encountered the resistance of employers’ 
representatives and was not followed up. The idea of limiting the definition of posted work 
temporally and with reference to tasks that are “not part of the normal activity” of a company 
was dropped after a formal objection of the State Council which warned about new 
infringement action.11  
In sum, although the ECJ undoubtedly constrained Luxembourg’s regulatory 
autonomy, it did so in a rather limited way.12 Luxembourg’s legislative response to the ECJ’s 
judgement was a step back from an initially very extensive interpretation of the PWD, 
deliberately taking the risk of a legal challenge by the Commission rather than 
“overimplementing” (Conant 2002: 70) the Directive from the beginning.  
CONCLUSION 
This contribution tackled a question which is challenging for both, political decision-makers 
responding to the ECJ and students of European judicial politics: How to take the law 
seriously (Joerges 1996) and, at the same time, not take it too seriously? In the examples 
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given, EU member states could hardly ignore or limit to the specific case the implications of 
the ECJ’s judgments for their national policies. To avoid further conflicts and the legal 
uncertainty involved, member state governments had to take the Court’s challenges seriously 
and remake their policies in community-compatible ways. Yet, they still had room for 
manoeuvre and creativity, to pursue at least parts of their original regulatory interests. In 
analytic terms, existing ECJ jurisprudence and the threat of litigation provided the strategic 
setting which conditioned, but did not determine member states’ political action. Furthermore, 
the chances to successfully accommodate national policies with EU law depended on both, 
political factors (consensus or dissent among potential litigants) as well as legal factors 
(existence or absence of legal precedent).  
The present focus on domestic political responses to the European judiciary has been 
justified with EU member states’ difficulties to react jointly. In fact, controversial ECJ 
judgments are often preceded by disagreement between and within member states in the first 
place. This makes joint decisions to politically revert or complement ECJ-driven integration 
very unlikely, at least in the short- and medium-term. Unless balancing community and 
autonomy in the EU is left entirely to the dialogue of courts, therefore, member state 
governments often need to explore domestically their remaining autonomy. Ultimately, 
studying domestic responses to the ECJ also helps to better understand decisions taken at the 
EU level: First, the Court may become “sensitised” to domestic concerns through member 
states’ political responses and, accordingly, “fine-tune” its own jurisprudence (Obermaier 
2008: 26). Secondly, member state governments may shape political integration by uploading 
their own regulatory responses to ECJ-driven integration to the European level. Domestic 
regulation “with Luxembourg in mind” then serves as a model of autonomy-regarding 
integration at the EU level.  
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NOTES 
1
 I would like to thank Alexandre Afonso, Philipp Genschel, Marie-Pierre Granger, Miriam Hartlapp, Adrienne 
Héritier, Dan Kelemen, Juan A. Mayoral, Diana Panke, Susanne K. Schmidt, Anne Thies, Benjamin Werner and 
Rebecca Zahn for their very helpful comments. I am grateful to the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced 
Studies in Florence, where this text was written during my time as a Jean Monnet fellow. Research is based on 
the project “Political autonomy in the European multilevel legal system”, funded by the German Science 
Foundation’s Collaborative Research Centre 597 “Transformations of the State” at the University of Bremen. 
2
 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd, ECR 2007, I-11767.  
3
 Case C-346/06, Rüffert, ECR 2008, I-1989 
4
 Case C-319/06, Commission v Luxembourg, ECR 2008, I-4323 
5
 Case C-438/05, Viking, ECR 2007, I-10779. In contrast to the other cases, Viking was decided on the basis of 
the freedom of establishment which makes the case rather specific. The following analysis, therefore, compares 
domestic responses to the three other rulings. 
6
 The impression that the Commission shied away from taking a more pronounced position because the conflict 
was “politically much too sensitive” was confirmed by an interview with a member of the Commission’s Legal 
Service, 30 November 2010. 
7
 Act on amendment of the Act on Posting of Workers, adopted 18.12.2008, entry into force 01.01.2009. 
8
 Changes to the Co-Determination Act and the Posting of Workers’ Act, adopted 05.11.2009, entry into force 
15.04.2010. 
9
 Loi du 11 avril 2010 portant modification des articles L. 010-1, L. 141-1, L. 142-2, L. 142-3 et L. 142-4 du 
Code du Travail. The law and the legislative process are documented in Dossier parlementaire No. 5942, online: 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/RoleEtendu?action=doDocpaDetails&id=5942 (Last checked: 10 February 
2011). For the citation, translated by the author, see p. 12 in document 5942/00 “Exposé des motifs”.   
10
 See Endnote 8, p. 5 in document 5942/00 “Exposé des motifs”, translated by the author. 
11
 See Endnote 8, p. 4-5 in document 5942/05 “Avis du Conseil d’Etat”. 
12
 Luxembourg’s parliamentary committee of labour and employment concludes: “It needs to be emphasised that 
the judgement and the present reform are far from substantially endangering Luxembourg’s social legislation. 
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The reform introduces some necessary adjustments which preserve social legislation at the same time as 
clarifying its applicability to posted workers”, see Endnote 8, p. 7 in document 5942/08 “Rapport de la 
Commission du Travail et de l’Emploi”, translated by the author. 
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